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Baselines for international carbon markets have to date been specified in form of GHG 
intensity factors and linked to business-as-usual developments. This means that with 
increasing production of goods and services through carbon market activities, absolute 
baseline emissions increase or fall only slowly. This generates a large ‘emissions gap’ to the 
emissions pathway necessary to reach the long-term target of the Paris Agreement. In 
contrast to these ‘traditional’ baseline setting approaches, baselines can also be ‘dynamic’. 
This paper focuses on one option of dynamic baselines meaning that they change over time 
on the basis of observable pre-determined parameters. In this context, we propose to 
calculate baselines by applying an ‘ambition coefficient’ to emissions intensities of business-
as-usual technologies. The coefficient would decrease over time and reach zero when a 
country needs to reach net zero emissions. Due to the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, this coefficient would fall more quickly for rich than for poor countries. The 
latter would still be able to generate emission reduction credits well beyond 2050, while for 
the former this would stop around 2035. Such an approach would generate certainty for 
carbon market investors. Only a dynamic baseline approach is able to ensure a continued role 
for carbon markets as it generated trust that the markets will operate in line with the long-
term ambition of the international climate policy regime. 
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International policy for mitigation of anthropogenic climate change has been developed over the last 
three decades, starting with the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
in 1992. Nevertheless, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have continued to increase. By early 
2021, CO2 concentrations had reached an increase of 50% compared to preindustrial levels (Green 
2021), and the rate of increase has not yet showed indications of slowing down.  
From its beginning, the international climate negotiation process has been plagued by the need to 
achieve consensus. While the Kyoto Protocol (KP) agreed in 1997 had a top-down architecture building 
on internationally negotiated quantified emissions limitation and reduction objectives, this 
architecture could not be extended beyond a limited group of industrialised countries. Key emerging 
economies objected to taking up legally binding emission targets, arguing that their burden would 
eventually be heavier than that of industrialized countries. This conflict led to the failure of the 
Copenhagen conference in 2009. It took until 2015 to pick up the pieces and design a new international 
climate policy regime that would replace the KP. This regime, embodied in the Paris Agreement (PA), 
now has a bottom-up nature. Countries define their national mitigation targets as per their national 
interest, and governments are free to define the metrics and coverage of their mitigation targets in 
their ‘Nationally Determined Contribution’ (NDC). In contrast to the KP, now all Parties to the PA 
engage in NDCs. These are to be ‘ratcheted up’ every five years. A ‘global stocktake’ held every five 
years will assess the overall level of mitigation achieved. 
The PA’s principal aim is ambitious. Global warming shall be stopped at ‘well below’ 2°C, aiming at 
1.5°C. Article 4 of the PA specifies the target to achieve a balance of greenhouse gas emissions and 
sinks in the second half of the century.  
The key challenge of the PA is to reconcile its bottom-up nature with the ambition of the long-term 
target. The first update of NDCs due in 2020 has been patchy and significant ambition increases have 
been rare; the COVID-19 crisis did not help. UN Environment (2020) states in its emissions gap report 
that the projected emissions gap between NDCs and 1.5-2°C compatible emissions paths in 2030 has 
increased over the last 10 years. As per UN Environment (2020) it stands at 12-15 billion t CO2e for the 
2°C path and 29-32 billion t for the 1.5°C one. Given the unabated increase of GHG concentrations the 
2010s can be seen as a “lost decade” in international climate change mitigation. 
However, not all is bleak. Prior to the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, a strong civil society 
pressure in many countries had been triggered by the ‘Fridays for Future’ youth movement. This led 
to strong shifts in election results towards green parties, and a number of countries declaring net zero 
emissions targets for years between 2035 and 2050.  
2. Background 
The overall situation with regards to business as usual (BAU) emissions and emissions pathways to 
reach the PA’s long-term target is shown in Figure 1 below. While BAU rises in the long term due to 
emergence of middle classes in developing countries, the two downward sloping curves show the 
emissions paths needed to reach stabilization of climate at 1.5°C and 2°C in a stylized fashion (for 
detailed discussions how these paths look like see IPCC 2018). Obviously, the paths for the former 
target are steeper than for the latter. For each temperature target level, the paths differ by their 
starting point – the steeper path assumes no mitigation is achieved before 2030, while the less steep 
one assumes that mitigation starts already from 2020. The earlier mitigation starts, the later the date 
at which net zero needs to be reached. It should be noted that a prolonged period of negative 





Figure 1: Global business as usual GHG emissions and pathways towards the long-term target of the PA 
 
Right from the start of international climate policy, international market mechanisms for climate 
change mitigation have been discussed. The KP included three such mechanisms. Two project or 
programme-based ones generate emission reduction credits compared to a baseline- the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) for activities in developing countries and Joint Implementation (JI) 
for activities in industrialised ones. The third one is based on trading emission units that are part of 
national emissions budgets (International emissions trading, IET). While the CDM and JI have been 
used massively between 2005 and 2013, generating 2 and 0.8 billion emission credits, respectively, 
until 2021 (UNEP DTU 2021), IET was shunned due to the perception that it leads to the sale of surplus 
emission budget, so-called ‘hot air’ (Michaelowa, Shishlov et al. 2019). 
The Kyoto Mechanisms were heavily criticised by NGOs and some researchers for various reasons, 
including perverse incentives for expansion of production of certain chemicals, the sale of ‘low-hanging 
fruit’, the registration of projects that would have happened under BAU due to their commercial 
attractiveness in the absence of revenues from sales of emission credits and the unequal geographic 
distribution of projects (Michaelowa, Shishlov et al. 2019, Shishlov and Bellassen 2012). From 2011 
onwards, this led to a reduction of demand for emission credits, with the EU first limiting use of 
emission credits in its emissions trading scheme (ETS) and other countries following suit. Therefore, 
prices for emission credits collapsed by 2013, and many observers saw no role for market mechanisms 
in the new international regime (Michaelowa, Shishlov et al. 2019).  
So, it came as a surprise that the PA again included two approaches to international market-based 
cooperation (Art. 6.2 and 6.4) whose rules remain under negotiation as of 2021. While market-based 
cooperation under Article 6 also allows linking of cap-and-trade systems, it is mostly considered to be 
implemented following a ‘baseline and credit’-approach akin to that applied under the CDM and JI. 
Now the critical question comes how this approach can be brought in line with the long-term ambition 
of the PA. Many observers say that market mechanisms lead to a “carbon lock-in” the countries 
acquiring emission credits, work against net zero targets and thus should be abandoned (see discussion 
of how to ensure environmental integrity of the mechanisms by Schneider and La Hoz Theuer 2019). 
Against this background, stakeholders call for international market mechanisms to at least contribute 
to an ambition increase of NDCs (Howard et al. 2017). 
A key parameter in the design of baseline and credit mechanisms is the specification of the baseline 




allocated to a mitigation activity while a lenient one will allocate a lot of credits 1 . Baseline 
methodologies will differ between concrete activities (projects or programmes) and mitigation policies 
(see Wooders et al. 2016 for a discussion of the latter). 
Traditionally, baselines under the CDM and JI have been determined on an intensity basis. This implies 
the calculation of GHG emissions per unit of production of a good or service. Therefore, absolute 
emissions can still increase if the production of the goods and services increases and the rate of 
production increase exceeds the rate of GHG intensity reduction. The CDM has achieved a downward 
trend in emission intensities, particularly in the case of industrial gas activities, but has not been able 
to prevent absolute emissions increases in host countries. 
Now in order to reach the PA long term targets we need an absolute decrease of emissions regardless 
of production levels. Therefore, an ‘emissions gap’ also occurs on the level of specific mitigation 
activities whose absolute emissions would have to go down dynamically but still do increase or only 
decrease slowly. Figure 2 shows the links between intensity-based assessments and changes in 
absolute emissions. 
Figure 2: Intensity baseline decline while absolute emissions increase -the emissions gap on an activity level 
 
The key question we want to address in this paper is how we can make baselines more stringent over 
time and make them consistent with the emissions paths leading towards net zero emissions in the 
second half of the century. We will call them ‘dynamic’ baselines in opposition to the traditional 
approaches to baseline setting under CDM and JI. 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that the fact whether credits are allocated at all depends on the additionality determination 
of an activity. If an activity is not additional, it should not generate any credits even if the eligible baseline 
methodology would lead to a positive allocation of credits. This would for example be the case if a commercially 
highly attractive and thus non-additional renewable electricity project faces the CDM baseline of a ‘combined 
margin’ grind emission factor which usually is greater than zero. In the other direction, a project may be 
additional, e.g. a fuel switch to a more costly lower carbon intensive fuel, but the baseline fuel already have a 
lower emissions intensity than the fuel the project has switched to. Additionality determination is particularly 
relevant in the context of the bottom-up determination of NDCs and the risk of hot air (Michaelowa, Hermwille 




We want to propose a conceptually robust approach to dynamic baselines that are in line with the 
long-term mitigation objective of the PA, while recognising the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR) for countries under the UNFCCC.  
We would like to stress that there are two different approaches to the conceptualization of these 
‘dynamics’. Baselines could be dynamic in the sense that they change over time on the basis of 
observable pre-determined parameters. Alternatively, they could change based on a pre-determined 
pathway, for example linked to global, regional or national paths towards net zero emissions. The 
former entails more uncertainty for the activity developer whereas the latter might be more prone to 
missing important developments. 
We aim at providing direct inputs into the ongoing negotiations on Article 6 rules by discussing how 
different baseline setting approaches can be dynamically adapted to be more ambitious over time2. 
The idea is to reach a ‘normative reference’ by applying a transition parameter we call “ambition 
coefficient”. By clearly setting out options we want to contribute to efforts to bridge opposing 
positions on Article 6 market-based cooperation principles, and particularly to operationalize the 
UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in Article 6 market-based 
cooperation. 
3. Use of dynamic approaches to baseline setting in UNFCCC negotiations 
The first official UNFCCC document defining approaches for baseline determination are the Marrakech 
Accords of 2001 specifying the rules for the CDM. They listed three approaches: a) Existing actual or 
historical emissions, as applicable, b) Emissions from a technology that represents an economically 
attractive course of action, taking into account barriers to investment or c) The average emissions of 
similar project activities undertaken in the previous five years, in similar social, economic, 
environmental and technological circumstances, and whose performance is among the top 20% of 
their category. Only the last approach includes a dynamic element, but none has a component that 
looks into the future. 
Over the years, CDM regulators very pragmatically applied these approaches in their approval of 
proposed baseline methodologies. For some technologies, mixed approaches were applied, for 
example for grid-connected electricity generation, where the ‘combined margin’ is a combination of 
approaches a) and c). Generally, the benchmark approach c) was used only rarely despite a regulatory 
push in the early 2010s.  
By early 2021, 252 CDM methodologies had been approved. However, only some of these have been 
used frequently. Some of the more widely used methodologies have been revised repeatedly; some 
even up to 20 times. Revisions generally tend to increase conservativeness of the methodologies. CDM 
methodologies often reference specific methodological tools of which 42 have been approved so far. 
Such tools address overarching issues (e.g. testing additionality, calculating a grid emissions factor, 
defining standardised baseline parameters) relevant for several activity types (or countries in the case 
of standardised baselines). They are used as elements ‘feeding into’ several methodologies, which 
formally reference them. It should be noted that no comprehensive comparative analysis of the CDM 
baseline methodologies and tools has been undertaken to date. 
While most CDM baseline methodologies did not lead to dynamic baselines, there are some 
precedents that can be used as examples for future dynamic baselines. The most conspicuous category 
is that of industrial gas projects, especially the reduction of HFC-23 from HCFC-22 production and of 
                                                          
2 Stringent dynamic baselines do not lead to overall mitigation of global emissions (OMGE), as host countries will 
’keep’ the not-credited emission reduction for their NDCs (Füssler, Kohli et al. 2019). Options to operationalize 




N2O from adipic acid as well as nitric acid production. The applicable baseline emissions factors per 
unit of product have been reduced significantly over time, becoming much stricter than actual values 
achieved in the past. This approach was chosen to prevent a perverse incentive for expansion of 
production due to the revenue from the sale of emissions credits being higher than that of the sale of 
product. However, the revisions only applied for future activities and did not influence the credit 
generation of a previously approved activity within the same crediting period. The increased stringency 
of the methodology was also no deliberate choice, but a de-facto outcome of the persistent criticism 
by international NGOs and academia (Schneider 2011). 
On a similar note, a dynamic outcome was achieved as conservative default factors replaced actually 
measured values in CDM methodologies.  The main reason for this shift was a significant reduction of 
transaction costs for activity developers. For example, the initial version of methodology AM 0046 for 
energy efficient lighting had very cumbersome monitoring requirements regarding the use pattern of 
lighting. The methodology thus was used very little. Subsequent versions applied default utilisation 
hours that were lower than those found through measurement, and usage of the methodology picked 
up. This experience showed that activity developers are willing to accept a reduction in credit volumes 
against a reduction in transaction costs (Michaelowa et al. 2009). 
Under the CDM, the overwhelming majority of methodologies has taken an intensity-based approach. 
The main reason for that is that the CDM had the explicit aim to further sustainable development in 
developing countries. It was therefore felt that demand for goods and services in these countries was 
‘suppressed’ compared to a situation where sufficient income was available. Therefore, these 
countries would have the right to increase their consumption of goods and services and not be 
penalised for it, especially given that industrialised countries had had the chance to do so in the past 
without any constraint on their GHG emissions. It needs to be noted that the argument of ‘suppressed 
demand’ becomes tenuous in emerging economies with a large middle class; its boundaries have never 
been defined. 
The link of the baseline to any national emissions pathway that is now seen as important was not seen 
as relevant under the CDM (Michaelowa et al. 2020), Reasons for that are that CDM host countries had 
no emission targets under the KP and that the CDM should not lead to a situation where host countries 
would be penalised for introducing policies leading to emission reductions3. Under the PA the situation 
is different and we will discuss this in the next section. 
While under the CDM all baseline methodologies had to be approved by the CDM Executive Board 
(CDM EB), under JI host countries could choose their own baseline methodologies if they chose a ‘Track 
1’ approach without international oversight4. While several countries in transition, especially Russia 
and Ukraine became very active as hosts under ‘Track 1’ leading to substantial problems with 
environmental integrity (Korppoo and Gassan-Zade 2014; Shishlov and Cochran 2015), none of them 
developed its own baseline methodologies. Under JI, Finland stood out with applying a very stringent 
baseline intensity factor for its N2O reduction projects in countries in transition 77% smaller than that 
calculated under the approved CDM methodology (Latvia and European Commission 2015). 
Füssler et al. (2014) provide a good overview of the status of the discussion in the immediate run-up 
to Paris that serves to elucidate the thinking of negotiators underpinning the wording of Article 6 of 
the PA. Here, the regulatory pathways resemble those of JI ‘track 1’ for Article 6.2 and the CDM for 
Article 6.4. Governments are free to decide on their baseline approaches when engaging in 
                                                          
3 This led to the development of the so-called ‘E- policy’ which stated that any mitigation policy introduced after 
the date of the Marrakech Accords should not be taken into account in baseline setting. 
4  Under a ‘Track 2‘ approach, the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC) would approve 
methodologies in a way similar to the CDM EB. However, no specific JI methodologies were ever submitted as 




cooperation under Article 6.2 given that there is no international oversight. For Article 6.4, the 
Supervisory Body (SB) will take up the task of approving baseline methodologies in a role comparable 
to the CDM EB under the CDM; the role of host countries is still unclear (Obergassel et al. 2020).  
Detailed international rules for baseline methodologies are currently negotiated by the Parties to the 
PA in the context of the Article 6.4 mechanism. Key principles for methodologies currently discussed5 
which could lead to a dynamic character of baselines include:  
 Conservativeness 
 Consideration of relevant national policies 
 Consistency with NDCs, long-term low GHG emission development strategies and PA long-
term targets (and thereby contribution to long-term transformation) 
 Encouraging an increase in ambition over time 
More specifically, Parties are negotiating the eligibility of specific approaches to baseline setting. 
Parties did agree that different baseline setting approaches may be appropriate for different types of 
activities but could not agree on which principal approaches to accept. The available options are 
included in the draft negotiation text in its iteration dated December 14th, 2019 (UNFCCC 2019) but 
were excluded from the draft rules, modalities and procedures in the draft text version of December 
15th as no agreement seemed possible. 
Option 1: Baselines must be ‘below BAU’ and consider relevant national, regional or local 
circumstances. The baseline approach chosen must be justified. Eligible approaches are based on best 
available technology (BAT) assessments, performance benchmarks, and other benchmarks. Only 
where these approaches are not economically and technologically viable, baselines can be based on 
projected or historical emissions (UNFCCC 2019, annex, paragraph 38). Füssler, Oberpriller et al. 2019) 
discuss how such benchmarks could be designed. 
Option 2: Baselines must “contribute to emission reductions and/or removals”, be consistent with the 
implementation of the host Party's NDC and the long-term goals of the PA, and take into account other 
relevant circumstances. Relevant circumstances include national, regional or local social, economic, 
environmental and technological circumstances. The default baseline approach is a performance-
based approach, where the baseline is set “at least at the average emission level of the best performing 
comparable activities providing similar outputs and services within a defined scope and boundary in 
the past three years and where the host Party may determine a more ambitious level at its discretion” 
(UNFCCC 2019, annex, paragraphs 40-41). Where such an approach cannot be applied, an alternative 
(in line with general principles) can be proposed, accompanied by a justification (ibid). 
Neither of the two options guarantees that countries may trade emissions credits only if they have 
reduced emissions beyond what one might consider their reasonable contribution to the overall 
objective of the PA. They may thus continue to create incentives against significant own emission 
reductions. From this perspective, both options are susceptive to lead to further emissions gaps. In 
contrast, the concept of dynamic baselines developed here can serve as a proposal to elaborate 
‘consistency with the long-term goal of the PA’. 
4. A conceptual approach towards dynamic baselines  
We develop an approach to make baselines consistent with net zero emissions pathways. It starts from 
the current baseline approaches fine-tuned over the last 15 years in the context of the CDM that define 
                                                          
5 A group of countries agreed on the San José Principles for High Ambition and Integrity in International Carbon 




BAU and through a gradually decreasing multiplier – an ‘ambition coefficient’ – over time reaches a 
‘normative reference’ consistent with the long-term target of the PA, i.e. the reaching of a net zero 
situation at some time in the second half of the century.6 The duration of this process, or ‘transition 
period’ is an important parameter that will be politically heavily contested. In this context, the 
application of CBDR will be important. For poor countries, the level of abatement costs that can be 
shouldered will be less than for rich countries resulting in different transition periods. 
Hermwille (2020) refers to the normative reference as an ‘ought margin’ This ‘ought margin’ refers to 
the normatively desirable endpoint of the emissions trajectory, i.e. zero emissions if we follow the 
long-term objective of the PA. The baseline is calculated as a weighted average of the BAU and the 
‘ought margin’, with the weights shifting over time from 100% BAU and 0% ‘ought margin’ to 0% BAU 
and 100% ‘ought margin’ (see Figure 3). This concept is inspired from the concept of the ‘combined 
margin’ in the grid electricity tool of the CDM where a weighted average of the ‘operating margin’ – 
the average emissions intensity of the electricity grid – and the ‘build margin’ – the emissions intensity 
of the power plants built in the last five years – is calculated. While the combined margin calculations 
have a fixed value for the weighting, in Hermwille’s Situation Ambition Concept the weights change 
over time. Hermwille (2020) does not use the zero-emissions target, but considers BAT as the ‘ought 
margin’ (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Transition from a BAU to an ‘ought margin’ defined by BAT through a dynamic baseline 
 
Source: Hermwille (2020), p. 12 
It is important to recognize that a BAT-oriented approach may not be sufficient to reach the long-term 
goal of the PA. Again, application of CBDR will be important, as levels of BAT should be different when 
applying the concept that reaching the BAT should not entail excessive cost. For poor countries, the 
level of costs that can be shouldered will be less than for rich countries. As researchers have noted in 
the past (see e.g. Füssler et al. 2019), benchmarks derived from BAT only work for some sectors and 
crucially, that they are only compatible with well below 2°C if the available technologies themselves 
are compatible with that goal. This is certainly not the case for technologies involving fossil fuels. Thus, 
a BAT ‘ought margin’ will not be a universal solution and may only be an interim step towards a long-
term solution. 
In this paper, we therefore focus on calculation of the ‘ambition coefficient’ derived from country level 
net zero emissions pathways, i.e. continuing beyond the ‘ought margin’ to reach zero. This also allows 
to specify the transition period. We apply the following steps in decreasing the level of aggregation: 
                                                          
6 While a double dynamic through a dynamic baseline and a dynamic normative reference could be envisaged, it 




First, we assess the ambition coefficient on a global level. It is derived from a global path towards net 
zero emissions. At the time of globally reaching net zero, the baseline for all emission reduction 
activities reaches zero, this means that from then onwards only negative emission technologies (NETs)7 
would generate emission credits (see Figure 4 which assumes a 1.5°C path is to be reached). 
Figure 4: Global ambition coefficient declining from 100% today to 0% at the time of reaching global net zero  
 
Given the CBDR principle, the time when countries will be required to reach the net zero level should 
differ, with rich countries reaching it earlier than poor ones (see Figure 5). This is also in line with the 
idea of ‘suppressed demand’ for goods and services in poorer countries. 
Figure 5: Different net zero pathways consistent with common but differentiated responsibility 
 
The conceptual application of the ambition coefficient is shown in Figure 6. The BAU emissions 
intensity as calculated in the CDM baseline methodologies will be multiplied by the ambition 
coefficient which declines over time. The assumed decline will be more rapid for rich than in poor host 
countries, i.e. the responsibility to reduce emissions will be higher for rich than for poor countries. 
                                                          
7 NETs include biological approaches such as afforestation and reforestation, but also technological approaches 
like direct air capture of CO2. For an overview of these technologies see Honegger et al. (2020). To date, the 
biological approaches have been used to a limited extent in the CDM, but widely in voluntary carbon markets. 





Figure 6: Application of the ambition coefficient to the BAU to derive a dynamic crediting baseline 
 
Most countries would be limited to NETs from 2030s onwards while poor countries could sell emission 
reduction credits until well into the 2nd half of the century. 
Figure 7: Reduction of baseline for rich and poor countries 
 
In order to provide investment certainty, an ex-ante fixation of the ambition coefficient valid for the 
relevant crediting period of the activity should be envisaged. An ideal approach would be to update 
the ambition coefficient with every NDC cycle (5 years) and in the light of the results of the most recent 
global stocktake to take into account whether countries are actually in line with the net zero pathways.  
5. Operationalizing dynamic baselines  
Which parameters should be applied to calculate the ambition coefficients in different country 
contexts? Obviously, NDCs and long-term low emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) could be a 
starting point, but its needs to be acknowledged that their ambition is often not commensurate to the 
country status, as shown by the Climate Action Tracker (2021). We therefore suggest to build on 
exercises like van der Berg et al. (2020) where large teams of researchers from around the world try to 




account both the country’s capacity and its responsibility for the current level of emissions. Such 
indicators could thus include:  
o GNI/capita 
o Cumulated historical emissions 
o Mitigation potential 
o Geographic criteria 
The characteristics of ideal country-specific pathways could look like as shown in Figure 8. Emissions 
in countries with high responsibility and financial capacity should drop rapidly to zero within the next 
15 years, whereafter these countries should employ a significant volume of negative emissions 
technologies. From this perspective indeed, for most industrialized countries, even an ‘ought margin’ 
of zero emissions may not be consistent with the long-term goal of the PA, but would need to go below 
that using NETs. Where this is not possible, these countries should finance an equivalent volume of 
mitigation in other countries. The volume of these technologies could then be reduced somewhat as 
other countries catch up. Countries with low responsibility would gradually reduce their emissions 
through domestic efforts and climate finance contributions until reaching zero around 2070.  
Figure 8: Ideal emissions pathways for countries with high and low responsibility 
 
Options for consideration of the indicators could be to calculate an individual baseline for each 
indicator and identify the most stringent one which then would be selected. An alternative would be 
a simple weighting system. The overall optimization is, in any case, constrained by the sum of emissions 
reaching zero in line with the 1.5- or 2°C target.  
To avoid uncertainty for investors, no ex-post check should be undertaken whether a country actually 
is on the path specified by the baseline. The ambition coefficient baseline is not linked to the 
decarbonisation pathways as determined in the NDC. Therefore, the host country targets do not 
influence the crediting baseline as long as they are less stringent. There is no potential for gaming for 
the host country, i.e. adopt less stringent targets to maximize carbon credit revenue.  
6. Discussion and further research questions  
Compared to current baseline approaches, our proposal of dynamic baselines is much more stringent. 
It would be in line with views that carbon markets for emission reduction activities would wither away 
in the future, as it makes baselines reach zero in large parts of the world before 2050. Still, we think 




whatsoever and those who see them as key vehicle to raise ambition and allow reaching the PA targets 
at politically manageable costs. 
In terms of political feasibility, it may be important to consider further relevant stakeholders. Carbon 
market actors and investors may see this proposal as creating barriers to the upscaling of carbon 
markets and a deterrent for the mobilization of private finance. Yet, the system ensures that at least 
some trade can still happen, and furthermore, current trade in emission reductions might be at least 
partially replaced by trade in negative emissions. In addition, in light of the alternative of reduced 
legitimacy of carbon markets unknot aligned with global mitigation action, investors may prefer a 
stringent but transparent system of dynamic baselines in the medium term to an uncertain future, like 
they preferred conservative defaults under the CDM to higher, but more costly monitored values. 
Finally, the approach suggested here, reduces political uncertainty as it explicitly considers long-term 
ambition and hence anticipates increased ambition. This provides a much better basis for mid-term 
business and investment planning than the current system in which ad hoc policy adjustments are 
highly probable. 
Experiences with the outcomes of emission reduction policies in the past across countries suggest that 
real world emissions paths of different country groups could look like in Figure 9. Rich countries would 
be slow in emission reductions, accelerating only between 2030 and 2040, and then increasingly 
engage in NETs over time. Poor countries would still increase emissions until 2030, and only shift their 
emission path downwards afterwards. 
Figure 9: Probable emissions paths per country group 
 
Governing and administering the ambition coefficients (or also BAT-related ought margins) can in 
principle be undertaken by UNFCCC entities like the support structure of the Article 6.4 SB. This would 
mirror the calculation of standardised baselines by the regional cooperation centres (RCCs) of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, which has frequently been undertaken in the latter years of the CDM8. Before the 
Article 6.4 infrastructure is in place, buyer country clubs like the supporters of the San José Principles 
could apply joint ambition coefficients. 
Questions for further research include whether the long-term pathway of a country and related 
ambition coefficient should be kept fixed in the long term, spanning several decades, or whether it 
would be re-calculated for every NDC implementation period or decade. Re-calculating the ambition 
coefficient would allow to take into account technological change that may be more rapid (for some 
sectors or countries) than initially foreseen. However, if countries deviate increasingly from the 
                                                          




ambition-compatible paths, i.e. do no implement climate policy in line with their responsibility and 
capacity, the re-calculation of the pathway would allow them to profit more from carbon credit 
revenues than countries that are taking their PA commitments more seriously. However, in these 
laggard countries, without a re-calculation, there would be a growing volume of emissions which could 
not be addressed as the country government does not want to act while the international carbon 
market can no longer be harnessed for its reduction. This incentive problem cannot be properly 
addressed. 
Instead of taking results determining national net zero pathways directly from exercises like van den 
Berg et al. (2020), how could one compute a multi-equation model to fit coefficients to the relevant 
indicators matching the global emissions path consistent with the ambition?  
A research question with far reaching consequences is how to set a dynamic baseline for NETs, both 
for biological approaches and those that do not involve biological means. For biological NETs historical 
/ BAU removal values can be used as in the determination of the baseline before the ambition 
coefficient is applied, as has been the case for afforestation and reforestation under the CDM. For non-
biological NETs the definition of the baseline, even before application of an ambition coefficient, needs 
to be clarified first.  
Should the baseline for non-biological removals remain zero once a country needs to provide a 
negative emissions contribution which means that the entirety of removal would be credited? Or 
should the baseline be reduced by the fraction of the contribution of the country to global GHG 
removals? The latter would mean that if the country has to provide 10% of the global non-biological 
removal volume, the baseline would only be 90% of the removal achieved by the activity? What would 
be the ‘ought margin’ for non-biological removals and how would it be determined, i.e. would an 
‘ambition coefficient’ be applied in this case?  
7. Conclusions  
Given the increasing opposition against international carbon markets, and the persistent decline in 
demand for emission credits in the international carbon market until very recently, a stringent and 
credible approach to baseline setting is required. An approach applying an ambition coefficient to a 
BAU baseline would allow to keep the accumulated knowledge of the CDM with regard to activity-type 
specific baseline development while bringing baseline setting into line with the long-term target of the 
PA. It would mean that baselines become zero once a country reaches the point in time where its 
emissions need to be zero in a fair global burden sharing approach. The poorer countries would still be 
able to generate emissions reductions credits for many decades (alongside removal credits), while the 
rich countries could embark solely on generating removal credits and would need to finance emission 
reductions through other means, in line with their responsibility and capacity. 
Such a system would be transparent and long-term oriented so that it could generate new trust in 
carbon markets and encourage new investments to reach the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement 
in an efficient way compatible with a fair distribution of costs and benefits. 
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